THE NATURE OF AMERICAN ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
The 2000 election made us all dimly aware of the intricacies of our elections. We learned about the high degree of decentralization merely from watching television reports of the court actions in more than six Florida counties, all seemingly independent from each other and from any significant state control. We also learned about the massive number of people involved in a recount as we watched the lines of observers line up day after day at the Emergency Operations Centers of Broward and Palm Beach counties. These institutional arrangements were not peculiar to Florida. As we have learned since 2000, U.S. elections are very complex undertakings:
When one looks at America's election system, one cannot help but be impressed with how well it works, given the enormous complexity, the lack of resources, and the extremely high expectations. To illustrate, the 2000 election produced a turnout of approximately one hundred million (100,000,000) voters and ended in a statistical tie. . . . Ballots were counted using five different technologies and dozens of different products. Voting was conducted at approximately two hundred thousand (200,000) polling precincts, staffed by approximately one point four million D URING NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER OF 2000, most of the world was bewildered by our struggle to end the election for President. Images of people holding punch cards up to the light to evaluate the position of chad did not instill confidence in anyone about the method of determining who won. Few of us had previously considered what happened to a ballot once we dropped it in a collection box. Stories emerged of voters showing up at the polls only to be told they were not on the register of eligible voters, yet we were ignorant of the way that those registration lists were compiled or maintained. Americans never really considered how poll workers were recruited or trained, only that voters were grumpy when poll workers did not seem to know what they were doing.
In the aftermath of the election, many commissions and task forces were created to identify the problems and institute remedies. States initiated legislative reforms. At the national level, the Congress began to consider legislation in earnest and, after intense negotiation, passed the Help America Vote Act ("HAVA") in October 2002. States are now in the process of making improvements to meet their HAVA obligations by the January 1, 2006 deadline. This paper describes the central events leading to the passage of HAVA, explains HAVA, and examines the pattern of state plans to implement HAVA. The paper closes with a discussion of (1) issues that impede HAVA im- (1,400,000) poll workers who were recruited from the local citizenry to work one day in performing America's most important public function. The vast majority of these poll workers received little training, worked 14 or more hours on the job and were paid minimum wage or less. While the dedication and commitment of these citizens is unquestionable, the reality is that they are plucked from their daily lives and jobs to perform a task a few times a year for which they have little expertise. The election process was supervised by approximately twenty thousand (20,000) election administrators. 1 At the same time, the costs of elections and voter registration have been borne, for the most part, not by the state or federal governments, but by local governments and by them only reluctantly:
The federal government bears no cost for the election of federal offices. Generally, state governments bear no cost for the election of legislatures, governors, state officers and judges. When local public policy makers are confronted with decisions such as buying new fire trucks, disposing of garbage, adding police officers or building and paving roads, etc., or to buy new voting equipment, pay election workers adequately or fund additional training, the decision usually does not favor the election improvements. 2 This institutional arrangement could not bear the strain of such a close national election. The result in 2000, unlike the prior election crises of 1800, 1824 and 1876, was that:
Every aspect of the election process was put under a microscope and viewed by an anxious nation that saw controversial ballot design; antiquated and errorprone voting machines; subjective and capricious processes for counting votes; rolls that let unqualified voters vote in some counties and turned away qualified voters in others; confusion in the treatment of overseas military ballots; and a political process subjected to protracted litigation. 3
THE BUSH v. GORE PRINCIPLES
Whatever one thinks of the Supreme Court's handling of the Florida recount, the Court's ultimate decision in Bush v. Gore 4 highlighted a number of very important points about America's election administration. Most importantly, the Court pointed out that the machinery, for a variety of reasons, does not count all the votes that are cast:
The closeness of this election, and the multitude of legal challenges . . . have brought into sharp focus a common, if heretofore unnoticed phenomenon. Nationwide statistics reveal that an estimated 2% of ballots cast do not register a vote for President for whatever reason, including deliberately choosing no candidate at all or some voter error, such as voting for two candidates or insufficiently marking a ballot. 5 Further, the various voting system types in use (paper ballot, lever, punch card, optical scan or touch screen equipment) can have markedly different levels of effectiveness. Finally, the standards for determining when to accept a ballot not conforming to the norm for each system vary widely (if not wildly). Responding to what was initially a last minute argument by the lawyers for George Bush, the Court agreed that there was a significant equal protection problem about the handling of the Florida recount and inferentially a significant equal protection problem nationally:
The right to vote is protected in more than the initial allocation of the franchise. Equal protection applies as well to the manner of its exercise. Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's vote over that of another. 6 Discussing the various specific inequalities in a dissenting opinion, Justice Souter stated that:
Petitioners have raised an equal protection claim . . . in the charge that unjustifiably disparate standards are applied in different electoral jurisdictions to otherwise identical facts. It is true that the Equal Protection Clause does not forbid the use of a variety of voting mechanisms within a jurisdiction, even though different mechanisms will have different levels of effectiveness in recording voters' intentions; local variety can be justified by concerns about cost, the potential value of innovation, and so on. But evidence . . . here suggests that a different order of disparity obtains under rules for determining a voter's intent that have been applied (and could continue to be applied) to identical types of ballots used in identical brands of machines and exhibiting identical physical characteristics (such as "hanging" or "dimpled" chads). . . . I can conceive of no legitimate state interest served by these differing treatments of the expressions of voters' fundamental rights. The differences appear wholly arbitrary. 7 Justice Breyer made similar observations in his dissenting opinion:
The manual recount would itself redress a problem of unequal treatment of ballots. As Justice Souter points out, . . . the ballots of voters in counties that use punch card systems are more likely to be disqualified than those in counties using optical-scanning systems. . . . Thus, in a system that allows counties to use different types of voting systems, voters already arrive at the polls with an unequal chance that their votes will be counted. I do not see how the fact that this results from counties' selection of different voting machines rather than a court order makes the outcome any more fair. 8 Whatever the precedential strength of the Court's opinion in Bush v. Gore, the disparate voting systems, disparate error rates and disparate counting standards have resulted in searching probes into how we run our elections.
POST-2000 STUDIES AND CONGRESSIONAL ACTIVITY
In the immediate aftermath of the election and the Supreme Court decision, a host of studies were launched to investigate what went wrong in the 2000 election and what improvements could be made. The most well known was that by a private commission headed by former Presidents Ford and Carter. 9 Other notable reports affecting the debate included a series by the United States General Accounting 6 Id. at 104-05. The Court did try to limit its opinion to the case before it:
The recount process, in its feature here described, is inconsistent with the minimum procedures necessary to protect the fundamental right of each voter in the special instance of a statewide recount under the authority of a single judicial officer. Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities. For several months thereafter, there was no meaningful action to get the conference underway. By the end of July there were public bursts of exasperation (from both the Democrats and Republicans through press conferences and counter press releases) over the lack of progress toward a final House-Senate compromise, with the substantive struggles focused on (1) the number of federal requirements to be imposed upon the states, (2) the specific requirement for first-time voters who register by mail to show identification ("ID") at the polling place, (3) the requirement for registration applicants to include in their applications their full Social Security numbers ("SSN"), (4) how much power the Justice Department would have to enforce the new requirements, and (5) a private right of action for enforcement of the states' new obligations. As described by Rep. Hoyer:
" 'Everyone agrees that we should make it easier to vote . . . and we should make it hard to cheat. . . . You can do things that make it easier to vote, but also make it easier to cheat. Or you can do things that make it harder to cheat, but can also impede voting. '" 25 By September, many involved in the conference process were describing the prospects for agreement as "bleak. 
Title I grant program
HAVA Title I authorized a $650 million General Services Administration ("GSA") program of payments to the states. Section 101 payments (half of the money) could, under Section 101(b), be used for eight enumerated general election administration purposes, including compliance with HAVA Title III and the acquisition of voting systems. The funds were to be distributed based on a minimum payment plus an additional sum derived from the states' respective voting age populations. Section 102 authorized payments (the other half of the $650 million) to states for the replacement of punch card or lever voting machines in those precincts that used such machines in the November 2000 election. If a state chose to receive such a payment, it had to commit to replacing all such machines in such precincts in time for the November 2004 election, extendible for good cause until the first general election (including a primary) held after January 1, 2006. The authorized amount was at best $4,000 per qualifying precinct.
Title II election assistance commission and requirements grants
Title II established the Election Assistance Commission ("EAC") to serve as an information clearing house, oversee the testing, certification, decertification and recertification of voting system hardware and software, provide election assistance and adopt voluntary guidance (Section 202). The EAC was designed to have as little regulatory power as possible. It has an even number of Members (four), any Commission action requires the approval of three Members (not a majority of sitting Members) (Sections 203 and 208), and for the most part it cannot "issue any rule, promulgate any regulation, or take any other action" imposing a requirement on any state or unit of local government (Section 209).
For voting systems, Sections 221 and 222 set up the machinery for adopting the voluntary voting system guidelines, with the active involvement of the U.S. Department of Commerce's National Institute of Standards and Technology ("NIST"). Section 231(a) authorized the EAC to provide for the testing, certification, decertification, and recertification of voting system hardware and software by accredited non-federal laboratories. NIST is to be involved in their accreditation and subsequent review of their performance (Section 231(b) and (c)).
Under Section 251, the EAC was authorized to make so-called Title III requirements payments to the states in each of three fiscal years, with very large aggregate funds authorized ( 1)). If a state certifies that it has met the Title III requirements, remaining funds can be used for other election administration improvements (Section 251(b) (2)). To receive the funds, a state has to certify that it has filed with the EAC a state plan, which HAVA enumerates must contain 13 elements (Section 254(a)), developed through a broad member committee (Section 255(a)) and open for public comment before adoption (Section 256). The plans must be published in the Federal Register (Section 255(b)). The EAC has separate authorization to make payments ($100 million in aggregate over the same three fiscal years) to states and units of local government to assure physical access to polling places for individuals with disabilities (Sections 261, 264).
If a state chooses not to receive federal funds for Title III compliance, then the state must file a compliance plan with the Department of Justice, and the state is deemed not in compliance with Title III until the Department of Justice approves the compliance plan (Section 402(b)).
Title III requirements
Title III contains minimum requirements (Section 304) for voting systems (Section 301), provisional voting and required information for voters (Section 302), computerized statewide voter registration lists (Section 303(a)) and requirements for first-time voters who register by mail (Section 303(b)).
Requirements for voting systems. Under HAVA Section 301, effective on or after January 1, 2006, voting systems are to: (1) Permit the voter to verify the votes selected before the ballot is cast; (2) Provide the voter the opportunity to change or correct the ballot before it is cast; (3) If the voter overvotes for a particular race, the system must: (a) Notify the voter that the voter had overvoted; (b) Notify the voter of the effect of overvoting; and (c) Provide the voter an opportunity to correct (Section 301(a)(1)(A)). The provision does not compel these requirements for voting systems that are based on paper ballots provided the jurisdiction establishes a voter education program with instructions to the voter on how to correct the ballot before it is cast (Section 301(a)(1)(B)). All the systems also are required to: (4) Produce a permanent paper record with a manual audit capacity (Section 301(a)(2)); (5) Be accessible for individuals with disabilities, with the same opportunity for access and participation, including privacy and independence, as for other voters (Section 301(a)(3)); (6) Meet the preexisting alternative language requirements of the Voting Rights Act 29 (Section 301(a)(4)); and (7) Meet the laboratory ("out of the box") error rate requirements of the existing Federal Election Commission's existing Voting System Standards ("VSS") (Section 301(a)(5)). Finally, each state is to adopt a uniform standard for what constitutes a vote for each category of voting system used in the state (Section 301(a)(6)). Section 301 was carefully circumscribed so as not to prohibit a state or jurisdiction from continuing to use, after the effective date of the provision, the voting system it used in November 2000 so long as the system meets or is modified to meet the requirements of the section.
Requirements for provisional balloting and voter information. HAVA Section 302(a) provides that, effective January 1, 2004, if an individual declares, through a written affirmation, that he or she is (1) a registered voter in the jurisdiction in which he or she wishes to vote and (2) eligible to vote in that election, then the in-dividual has an automatic right to file a provisional ballot if the individual's name does not appear on the official list of eligible voters for that polling place or an election official asserts that the person is not eligible to vote. HAVA Section 302(b), also effective January 1, 2004, requires the public posting of the following information at each polling place on the day of election: (1) A sample version of the ballot; (2) Information about the hours in which the polling place will be open; (3) Instructions on how to vote, including how to cast a provisional ballot; (4) Instructions for mail-in registrants and first-time voters (relevant to the ID requirements); (5) General information on voting rights including how to contact the appropriate officials in the event of a violation of those rights; and (6) General information on federal and state law prohibitions against fraud and misrepresentation.
Computerized statewide voter registration lists. HAVA Section 303(a), effective January 1, 2004 but extendable for good cause to January 1, 2006, is designed to force states to create: "[A] single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list defined, maintained, and administered at the State level." The list is to be the official list of registered voters throughout the state and is to contain a unique identifier for each voter. The list is to be "coordinated" with other state agency databases (in particular, records on felons and on deaths) and immediately accessible electronically by "any election official" in the state. The list is to be maintained in accordance with the requirements of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 ("NVRA"). 30 For new registration applicants, the application is not to be "accepted or processed" unless the application contains the applicant's driver's license number or, lacking one, the last four digits of the applicant's Social Security number. If the applicant has neither a driver's license nor Social Security number, the state is to assign a unique identifying number to the applicant. The Chief State Election Official is to enter into an agreement with the official in charge of the State Motor Vehicle Authority to match the statewide voter registration database with the information in the Motor Vehicle Authority database to enable both officials to verify the accuracy of the voter registration application information. The official in charge of the State Motor Vehicle Authority additionally is to enter into an agreement with the Social Security Commissioner for the Commissioner to verify certain of the applicant's information (name, date of birth, Social Security number and whether or not shown in Social Security records as deceased) for persons submitting the last four digits of their Social Security number instead of a driver's license number.
Identification requirements for voters who register by mail. HAVA Section 303(b), effective January 1, 2004, requires a voter who registers in a jurisdiction by mail, who has not previously voted in the state in an election for federal office or who has previously not voted in the jurisdiction and the jurisdiction is in a state not having a Section 303(a) statewide voter list, to present a photo ID or one of a number of documentary identifications when voting for the first time in person (or photocopies of such documents when voting for the first time by mail). If the person does not present such identification, the person's ballot will be treated as a provisional ballot. However, if the person at the time of the mail registration provides his or her driver's license number or SSN last four digits, and the state can match the information with an existing state identification record, then the person need not bring the identification document to the polls or submit a photocopy at the time of an absentee vote. Because of the "has not previously" language, this ID requirement applies only once to a new registrant, and should not apply at all to preexisting registrants.
Title IV enforcement
HAVA Title IV establishes two forms of remedy if the requirements of HAVA are not met. Under HAVA Section 401, the Department of Justice can seek declaratory or injunctive relief to carry out the HAVA Sections 301, 302 and 303 requirements. In addition, under HAVA Section 402(a), the states are to establish administrative complaint procedures under which: (1) Any person believing that there has been a Title III violation can file a sworn, notarized written complaint; (2) The complainant can insist on a hearing regarding the complaint; and (3) If the state determines that there has been a violation, the state "shall provide the appropriate remedy." The state is to reach its determination within 90 days of the filing of the complaint unless the complainant agrees to an extension. If the state fails to meet the 90-day deadline, there is to be a 60-day alternative dispute resolution procedure. There is no federal requirement for an opportunity to go to court for a dissatisfied complainant.
THE STATE PLANS FOR IMPLEMENTATION 31
HAVA has the effect of moving from an environment of local control with loose state and limited federal oversight to an environment of strong state control and loose federal oversight. Many states before HAVA had very few state employees to address the issues addressed by HAVA. 32 Thus, the requirement for submitting state plans, with explicit topics to be included, was essential for galvanizing the state governments. In addition, mandating procedures for public participation and public comment was meant to mitigate political opposition to subsequent state action. 33 The eligible 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and the Virgin Islands all filed their plans with the FEC's Office of Election Administration ("OEA") (as proxy for the EAC before its creation). My review of the plans of the 50 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico shows them mostly following the HAVA mandated structure. The vast bulk of the texts give little indication of how the states actually intend to fulfill the HAVA requirements. This is not surprising inasmuch as congressional staff urged the states to file their plans as soon as possible so that they could receive their funds from the EAC quickly. Clearly, the 10.5 month delay in creating the Commission 34 has made the haste unnecessary. Nonetheless, many contain initiatives that other states can profitably copy.
Funding
Because of the federal funding uncertainty at the time the plans were filed, many states premised their plans on only the level of appropriated federal funds enacted or announced. 35 Other states assumed full funding but with misgivings. 36 The funding uncertainty had additional negative effects. For instance, one state saw virtue in delaying its decision on a new voting system pending better information about future federal funding levels. 37 As for the distribution of the funds within a state, one state chose not to distribute any to local governments in order to cut down on cumulative overhead: Other states were willing to make distributions, but a number included in their plans a maintenance of effort requirement on the counties analogous to the HAVA requirement on the states. 39 Several are using their buying power to save money on voting system purchases, buying on behalf of their counties and, in some cases, possibly in combination with other states. 40 Other states are trying to economize by inducements or pressure upon the counties (for instance, to reduce the number of precincts or polling places). 41 
Before election day
Statewide registration lists. Most states are aggressively working to create HAVA compliant centrally-run registries. Several states identified additional incentives for promptly building their lists: To define the subset of mail-in registrants, thereby reducing the number of voters required to produce identification (in turn reducing the number of November 2004 provisional ballots) 42 and to identify at the time of registration voters with accessibility or alternative language needs. 43 Nine states, believing they have HAVA-compliant lists, chose not to invoke their right to a waiver until 2006. 44 Some states face difficulty in moving their largest population counties onto their lists because of differences between the computer architecture of the state and local county lists and resistance by the counties to any such move. Certain localities believe their individual systems are better than their state's. 45 For the HAVA registration form questions regarding citizenship and age, Florida has concluded that it need not alter its existing forms which ask similar but not identical questions:
The forms do not discourage voters by telling them to stop with the application if they must answer "No" to either question. The [state] is complying with the substance of HAVA if not with the exact form of the question. 46 (As part of its registration database, Puerto Rico innovatively has collected digitized signatures and digitized photographs of all voters. Beginning in 2004 the voter lists at the polling places will also contain those photo images.) 47 As for first-time mail registrants, several states are planning multiple mailings to registrants asking for any missing information. For one, the goal is to minimize the need for special procedures for such individuals at the polls, thereby reducing the perception that some voters are being treated differently than others. 48 Voting systems (machines). The plans reflect a wide variety of responses to the HAVA requirements. Some states are aggressively moving to purchase one Direct Read Electronic ("DRE") (i.e., touch screen, ATM-type machine) system for the whole state. 49 Some are delaying their choices because of (1) the federal funding uncertainty, (2) uncertainty over what the EAC will ultimately decide constitutes HAVA Title III compliance, (3) hoped-for technological improvements or price declines 50 or (4) the controversy over DRE security. Many are concerned about their need to retain a non-DRE system for absentee ballots even if they switch to a DRE system for in-person voting. Some are leaving the choice to local governments. 51 Several states are focusing on reduc-
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ing the number of DRE's to purchase by reexamining their number of precincts. 52 Some are striving to retain their current systems, including paper balloting, for reasons of economy or tradition. 53 A number of states are structuring their RFP's so that, for system purchases before the EAC announces what is HAVA Title III compliant, the vendor will bear the burden of retroactive improvements should the system not meet the eventual compliance standard. 54 Most state plans do not discuss (1) requiring upgradability, (2) state ownership of the vendor's software source code, or (3) the state's independently testing the source code. 55 Several plans touch upon the DRE ballot voter verification controversy without necessarily taking a position. 56 As for certification, decertification and error rates, some states already have decertification mechanisms, while others plan on establishing them. 57 The error rate issue remains a significant problem. Most plans emphasize that their existing systems already meet or will meet the VSS "out of the box" error rate for new machines. 58 States do plan to collect residual vote data in anticipation of any future federally established "in the field" operational error rate. 59 With regard to ballot uniformity and layout, several states already have requirements for uniform ballots throughout their state and, to maintain uniformity, the Secretary of State approves all ballot content and layout. 60 
Accessibility of polling places and voting systems
Accessible polling places. A starting point issue for polling place accessibility is determining what the standard for "accessible" should be. One state considers a polling place accessible if the entrance was level or had a nonskid ramp of not more than 8 percent gradient; doors have to be a minimum of 32-inches wide. 61 Another adopts the federal accessibility standards found in the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act, but that law merely sends the definition back to the individual states. 62 Others require conformity with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"). 63 Many announced that the states would survey all polling places for accessibility, with some ensuring that people with disabilities will be included on the survey teams. 64 Accessible voting systems. To ensure systems' accessibility, a few states contemplate formal recommendations from their disabilities communities. 65 Others plan on vendor fairs to enable citizens with disabilities to give vendors direct feedback before systems are submitted for certification. 66 One state is planning to tie system accessibility to polling place accessibility, requiring counties receiving HAVA money for new systems to certify (1) cooperation with the polling place accessibility survey, (2) compliance with the state polling place accessibility standards, and (3) establishment of, and cooperation with, a local advisory council to choose accessible polling places. 67 As for meeting the requirement with DRE's, one state is planning to buy two DRE's per polling place, making them available to all voters with priority for the elderly and the disabled. 68 Another plans to make DRE's available during the in-person absentee voting period. 69 
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Training for election officials, poll workers, and voters
Election officials. Several states plan to offer their election officials' training program to state political party officials, candidates, their workers, and lawyers. 70 Two states have training programs for voting machine technicians, and one plans greater emphasis on such training "to assure that counties do not rely on vendors for the operation and programming of their voting systems." 71 Many states are planning new training methods and partnering with specific colleges or universities in their states to develop their training programs. 72 Poll workers. Many states have plans for more aggressive and innovative training of poll workers, with some emphasizing (1) basic customer servicing techniques ("No other government function has this level of contact with citizens in such a short time span."), (2) sensitivity training, (3) services to voters with disabilities and special needs ("Only a fraction of our poll workers have been exposed to training at any level that teaches how to service this ballooning population."), (4) civil rights ("Often voters who encounter a problem with voting are treated as having done something wrong.") and (5) accounting/ballot security. 73 States plan on using training delivery methods that are easily accessible, reusable by the trainees, flexible to accommodate updates and effective in trainee retention. 74 The methods include the use of professional trainers and role playing. 75 Some plans also discuss increasing the number of poll workers. A number of states will try to use more students, possibly through partnerships with campus organizations such as student councils, campus political committees, community and service learning centers, campus media, increased use of information in course catalogues and web sites, and stipends. 76 Some want to make the poll worker pay uniform within the state or comparable to other similarly situated jurisdictions in the nation. At least one is planning on hiring a professional recruiter. 77 Voters. For educating voters, most plans discuss increased use of broadcast and cable (both public and commercial) or publication media. 78 Some will target specialty (e.g., minority) media 79 or will target first-time voters. 80 Many describe increased use of the Internet, including video clips about specific types of voting systems, software to access the state's voting machine simulators via the Internet, candidate background and issue videos, ballot previews, disabled voter web site access through TTY (i.e., teletypewriter, also referred to as text telephones or as TDD, telecommunication device for the deaf) or TTY relay service, instant messaging, voice recognition software or audio capability for the hearing impaired. 81 To increase student participation, states are planning:
1. Voter registration/education programs at least once each year in each public high school 2. Contests among school children to develop slogans and logos promoting increased voter turnout 3. To send birthday cards to persons when they become 18 with a voter registration invitation 4. To use driver's license data and other ways to encourage disabled teens to vote 84 All of this increased voter education will pay off. Certainly, it did for Georgia when rolling out its new DRE voting systems statewide:
The undervote rate for the 2002 U.S. Senate Election was a historically low 0.86% (a dramatic reduction, compared to the 2000 Presidential Election undervote rate of 3.5% and the 1998 U.S. Senate Election undervote rate of 4.8%). 85 
Election day
A central accomplishment of HAVA is to require offering all voters provisional ballots if there are any questions about their qualification to vote. The HAVA requirement is in response to common circumstances arising on election day:
[T]he voter's name could not be found on the printed list at the polls because of a spelling variation, name change, hyphenation (used or missing), or the inversion of parts of the voter's name. Conditional ballots [functionally similar to provisional ballots] have also been counted when the voter successfully appealed his removal from the list, a completed and timely application was found, or it was determined that the voter's name was removed in error. Conditional ballots are usually not counted because no record could be found of the person's registration, the voter was in the wrong precinct, or the voter had applied after the registration deadline for that election. 86 All states should now have provisional ballot regimes in place, complying with the HAVA IMPLEMENTING THE HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT 435 requirement's effective date of January 1, 2004.
As for the posting of voter information in the polls (also effective January 1, 2004), most states are following the HAVA list of required topics, but some are considering a more extensive list of rights. 87 The first-time voter ID requirement likely will be a significant problem in the short run. States are taking different approaches. Some are liberally construing what constitutes satisfactory ID, planning to monitor the provision's application (giving voters instructions on how to report allegations of illegal application), or in order to diminish the number of persons required to show ID at the polls, providing registration applicants a second chance to submit such ID before election day. 88 Others have taken a stricter approach, in some instances requiring all voters to show ID:
Since the vast majority of our voters register by mail, the secretary of state's office did not want to further burden our elections officials by having them identify first time voters and ask them for identification. We feel our "everyone" provision will further meet the HAVA goals of providing a uniform and nondiscriminatory voting process. Our first time and transfer voters will not be treated differently. 89 Anticipating a surge in provisional ballots (either through their general availability or through the ID requirement), some states are going to: Hire additional poll workers ("so that provisional voters will not be discouraged by long waits to cast their ballots"); experiment with multiple work shifts for certain poll worker positions in order to reduce the time commitment necessary to serve as a poll worker; provide special help to voters filling out provisional ballots and program DRE's to segregate provisional ballots so that persons with disabilities can cast such ballots on accessible machines. However, at least the District of Columbia also apparently plans to continue its policy that a provisional ballot can only be cast in the precinct to which the voter is assigned. 90 For the court ordered poll hour extension provisional ballots, some states plan to uniquely mark such ballots to ease any necessary retrieval. 91 Finally, some states want to better understand the election process "through the eyes of the 'consumer.'" To receive voters' feedback on the new equipment and procedures, those states plan to conduct exit polling of a sample of voters. 92 
After election day
Some states plan on obtaining enough information when giving out a provisional ballot to register the person for future elections should the person not be eligible in the election at issue. 93 An additional problem involves limiting the information on ultimate disposition to only the voter concerned. At least the District of Columbia plans to reduce the wider access it currently provides down to only the voter. 94 Many states in describing their required complaint procedure merely parrot the HAVA requirements. One emphasizes principles for the process, including that it not be complicated for the aggrieved party, be easily accessible for the disabled and be easily tracked by all interested parties. 95 Another plans to have a committee that includes outsiders (such as representatives of the parties and of advocacy groups) review all complaints. 96 A number of states declare that the complainant will have a general right to judicial review of the administrative decision. 97 Other states discuss limited judicial review 98 or no judicial review, 99 for instance, on the ground that:
This complaint procedure is intended to be less formal than most administrative procedures, with potential violations be-ing more likely to represent system-wide problems than individual voting rights. Thus, the possible remedies will be less personal in nature. 100 Focusing on the remedies, states are prohibiting monetary damages or punitive orders:
A remedy . . . will not include financial payments to complainants or civil penalties for election officials, even if it is determined that a violation of Title III has occurred. Remedies may include written findings that a violation of Title III has occurred, strategies for insuring that that violation does not occur again and, if it appears that the complaint involves a systemic problem, possible actions by the Elections Division to provide better instructions, training, or procedures for all election officials to avoid future violations. 101 One explains that its "relief may not include any order affecting the right of any person to hold an elective office or affecting the canvass of an election on or after the date of that election." 102 
Performance measures
Finally, most states promised detailed performance measures to determine if they are meeting the goals of their plans. The measurement tools fall within two groups, process measurements (Did the state do what it said it would do?) and impact measurements (Did those activities make a difference in the conduct and participation in elections?). In one state's view, the improvements must be measured in terms of "how well they increase participation in elections and improve the ability of voters to exercise their right to vote." 103 Only a few of the plans set out detailed measures. 104
CONCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS-WHAT ELSE IS TO BE DONE
The enactment of HAVA was a remarkable achievement given that the Congress was so evenly split (Senators: 50 Democratic, 49 Republican, 1 Independent; Congressmen: 220 Republican, 210 Democratic, 5 Independent). If Sen. Jeffords had not changed parties, there easily might not have been any law enacted. Additionally in retrospect, the window of opportunity was also very short given the Republican Party's regaining control of the Senate a few weeks after the passage of HAVA. During the window, each party controlled one House of Congress, and neither wished to be blamed for the demise of the bill. Therefore, they both had to compromise. The dynamics would have been far different in the current Congress of complete Republican control. Any Republican bill would have had weaker federal regulation, and the Democrats might have chosen to block a bill rather than pass a weaker one.
But HAVA was enacted and while it addresses many issues, certain important election reform issues remain. As for the EAC operational funds, the Congress appropriated only about $1.8 million for FY 2004 107 even though HAVA had authorized an annual budget of $10 million. The shortfall has made it extremely difficult for the EAC to function in the short run. 108 The President's FY 2005 budget proposal restores the $10 million figure, but assuming its adoption by the Congress, it will not provide an effective operational budget until October 2004. The salaries of the Commissioners and their immediate staffs will consume much of the money until the new fiscal year. 109 The lack of operational funding also inhibits the EAC, in conjunction with NIST, from expeditiously addressing the DRE security issues or the underlying Title III voting systems compliance standards.
HAVA implementation issues
The delay in creating the EAC and the consequent delay in distributing the Title III funds also is inhibiting state decision making. Given the states' severe financial difficulties, they are loath to make expenditure commitments without being certain about their financial resources. The delayed appropriations and distribution, along with issues like DRE security and the lack of Title III systems standards, are causing delays in the states' awarding contracts both for the state voter registration systems and for new voting systems. All this threatens the ability of the states to meet the HAVA deadline of January 110 The debate over DRE security began in earnest with the July 2003 release of a study by four professors, three of them at Johns Hopkins University. The study identified security problems in the software source code attributed to a voting system purchased by Maryland and Georgia. 111 In response, Maryland commissioned a study by Science Applications International Corporation ("SAIC") of the new system. SAIC concluded that the Johns Hopkins paper had highlighted legitimate concerns but had not taken into account the state's procedural protections offsetting some of those concerns. 112 This has generated even more studies of the Maryland voting system. 113 
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Meanwhile, the Ohio Secretary of State commissioned assessments of the DRE systems to be used in Ohio. 114 Other states and local governments are mandating voter-verifiable ballots, 115 and the calls for delaying procurements of new systems pending resolution of the DRE security issues are proliferating. 116 The debate is very active and has created uncertainty among election administrators. They are unwilling to make significant procurement decisions until they get some comfort about the security of DRE machines. The 2001 Election Center Task Force was opposed to individual voter paper receipts showing voters their votes. Such receipts, if the voters took them out of the polling place, would be a threat to the secrecy of the ballot and would promote vote bribery, intimidation and vote manipulation. 117 Another worry of administrators is that adding a printer increases the overall complexity of the voting system, the possibility of breakdowns that poll workers are not equipped to repair, and even if they were, the likelihood of partial or total shutdown of the polling place for some portion of election day. Also, it is unclear what would be the official basis of the count, the electronic record or the paper record. Manual recounts of paper ballots are conceivable in small jurisdictions and for small samples of large jurisdictions (e.g., some states mandate automatic recounts of one percent of the votes cast). But recounting manually 100 percent of the ballots in a state like California would be a huge undertaking and unreliable because of human error. All these issues make the election administration community very nervous about voter verified DRE ballots. 118 The four principal sponsors of HAVA (Rep. Ney, Rep. Hoyer, Sen. Dodd and Sen. McConnell) issued a joint Dear Colleague letter on March 3, 2004 calling legislation mandating voter verified ballots premature and undermining of the HAVA provisions on disability and language minority access. The sponsors urged the members of Congress to let the EAC develop the appropriate standards for DRE security.
As mentioned above, the EAC lacks the operational funds to move aggressively on these problems. The EAC's Technical Guidelines Development Committee should be leading this effort, but it is only now coming into existence and will take several months to become active. In addition, NIST has been given no additional funds for undertaking its work. NIST did conduct a two-day introductory conference in December 2003 to address the issue. It is imperative that state election administrators receive some guidance very soon if they are to have any realistic prospect of meeting the January 1, 2006 deadline for having HAVA Title III compliant voting systems in place.
What constitutes a vote. The next most pressing issue is how to count votes in the event of a recount or contest. The Ford/Carter Commission emphasized the need for quick state adoption of objective standards for each voting system, but HAVA set an effective date of January 1, 2006 for the requirement. The state plans demonstrate that not much progress has really occurred. Many of the states have sent the issue to some committee for further study.
Despite the HAVA 2006 deadline and given the predictions of a close 2004 presidential election, it is imperative that the states move more quickly to adopt the kind of standard that Florida has shifted toward. But the states need to go even further. There should be an illustrative list of possible ballot marking variations for each voting system used in a state and rules for accepting or rejecting those individual variants as legitimate votes. The more objective the IMPLEMENTING THE HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT 439 safe harbor's six-day cutoff because "the time available between the popular election and the meeting of the electors is quite limited and should all be available for canvass of votes and subsequent judicial or other decision, if necessary." 129 The law enacted moved the congressional counting date to January 6th (still in U.S. law as 3 U.S.C. § 15), the electors' meeting to the State Department's proposed date (still in U.S. law as 3 U.S.C. § 7), and kept the six-day cutoff. 130 There was virtually no legislative history, 131 but the Judiciary Committee Chairman Hatton Sumners (the introducer of the Administration bill) declared during the House debate that:
[T]here is not enough time . . . between the election of the electors and the time when they are to meet. . . . The time for the general election should be moved up to . . . October . . . to allow a reasonable time for settling contests over the election of Presidential electors. 132 In subsequent years, he repeatedly introduced bills to move election day to October. Introducing the 1935 bill, Mr. Sumners stated that: 41 days . . . is clearly too short a time to canvass the returns and to have any opportunity properly to settle any election contest with regard to the electors. . . . [I]t cannot be done in 41 days under the laws of any of the States. 133 In 1939, he argued:
[W]e ought to [move the election into October] . . . very quickly, because a serious situation might develop. . . . It requires no great imagination to visualize what might develop in a close election when feeling was running high with a belief that wholesale fraud had been perpetrated in one or more pivotal States with no possibility of a final judicial determination prior to the time for the inauguration of the President. 134 Sumners' "serious situation" arose in 2000 and easily may again this year. Congress before this fall's election should lengthen the period. In an era of electronic communication and overnight couriers, (1) the electors' meeting should occur as few days as possible before the January 5th congressional counting, (2) the safe harbor six-day cutoff should be eliminated and
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way Congress will adopt such a card is as part of a homeland security initiative. Absent that extreme need, the fears of Big Brother will not permit a national voter identity card.
National level centralization
Finally, there is the question of whether we should strive to adopt institutional arrangements and procedures like those of our neighbors, Canada and Mexico. The short answer is that, while goals like a nonpartisan national election agency are laudable, they are unattainable at least in the short run. Mexico was able to create such institutions only through a 1946 post-revolution consolidation of power and then 1996 reforms stemming from the mandate President Zedillo received in the clean and transparent presidential election in 1994. 137 In Canada, the creation in 1920 of the independent and nonpartisan position of Chief Electoral Officer for the country resulted from the disastrous 1917 general election; arguably the worst since 1841. 138 Those conditions did not exist in the United States in the wake of 2000. Political power remains equally split between Republicans and Democrats despite Republicans' nominal control of both houses of Congress. The outcry after the 2000 election focused on machines, registration lists and voter access, the adequacy of funding, and the activities of one state's administrators, not a wholesale condemnation of state and local administrators generally. The political response addressed those issues, and until there is a crisis of confidence comparable to those leading to the more fundamental reforms undertaken by Mexico and Canada, we will not move toward true central government control. Our governmental structure, designed to inhibit rapid radical change, has done so again in passing and now implementing HAVA.
In summary, there is plenty of work to be done in fulfilling the requirements of HAVA. More sweeping change will occur only if a more trying time than the 2000 election arises in the future.
